"Deleting"
a file from
most
computers does not
actually remove the contents of the file, but rather simply unlinks the
file
from the file directory system, leaving the entire contents of the file
on the hard disk. This data will remain in the disk
sectors until the operating
system reuses the
sectors when writing new data. Until the old data is overwritten (and
this may
take many overwrites over many months), it can be recovered by programs
that read
disk sectors
directly, such as forensic software (so called because it is used to
obtain
evidence in criminal investigations).
In order to be sure that a deleted file really is deleted, it is necessary to repeatedly overwrite the data sectors of that file. This process is not simply “erasing” or “formatting” the drives, which is not sufficient, as there are numerous tools available to recover “lost” data from residual magnetism on disk drives. To erase data from a drive, wiping programmes overwrite each bit on the drive with unusable, nonsensical, data. The unusable data bit replaces the magnetic imprint of the previously written bit, but, because drive heads wobble, it makes sense to overwrite the data on the drive more than once as the drive head will track differently over the disk during different writes. The older the drive, the more writes are needed to ensure that the old data has been replaced by unusable data. The newer the drive, the fewer passes are needed.
The
following is paraphrased
from an
article by Steve
Elderkin, a computer
forensics expert.
If a search is made on the
Internet for the answers to these questions, confusion reigns. Many
articles will say that there is no safe way to completely erase the
information stored on a hard drive, other than by destroying it with a
hammer (which method, incidentally, is completely useless), or by
immersing the platters in an acid bath. Let us
look into this more closely.
Computers
change at a rapid rate. Most of the overwriting standards
were written by government agencies as a means of destroying data on
drives containing
unclassified
material. These standards were based on the specifications
of the hardware available at the time. The architecture of a ten
megabyte drive produced in the early 1980s is very different from that
of a modern 250 gigabyte drive.
The disks are coated with a cobalt
based
alloy which has
magnetic properties. This magnetic layer stores individual pieces of
data, or "bits", in a series of circular tracks. The
diagram below represents a single bit of data stored on a hard disk,
magnified
many thousands of times.
![]() In this example, the particular bit on the hard drive has been written four times. To the left hand side of the diagram, on the older hard drive, the imprints of previous writes can clearly be seen. This means that it is possible to recover data left from a previous file by reading the small amounts of magnetic charge left around the edges. The more modern the drive, the less wobble there is in the disk heads, resulting in a lower chance of having any residual bits of data to look at. Is it possible to recover old, overwritten, data with an electron microscope, advanced statistics, and special programming skills? Data recovery, even with these specialised and powerful tools, is so difficult that it can be called impossible. There are thousands of millions of bits on a disk - it would take years to recover enough bits to begin to think about looking for data, and, even then, it would be virtually impossible to know which bits of data combine with which others. The chances of recovering previously overwritten data on a newer drive are even lower than on an older drive. How many overwrite passes are needed? One! Data is so incredibly difficult to recover after being overwritten that, even with the special tools and knowledge described above, data is not going to be recovered from the drive. Internet searches for examples of overwritten data being recovered show no events where a person recovered more than a couple of bits of a byte. The Department of Defense standards may help the fearful to sleep better at night, but one overwrite is enough to protect any data from being recovered. Companies need to to be able to completely trust the organisation which receives their end-of-life IT equipment, and the people within that organisation. Does the organisation have a dependable procedure in place to:
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